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PRIMA FACIE TORT RECOGNIZED
IN MISSOURI
Porter v. Crawford & Co. 1
Plaintiff sustained lamage in an automobile collision involving a motorist
insured by Carriers Insurance Company. In settlement of plaintiff's claim,
Carriers' agent and adjuster, Crawford & Company, delivered a draft to
the plaintiff. Plaintiff deposited the draft in his checking account and wrote
checks against the deposit. Without notifying the plaintiff, Carriers stopped
payment on the draft, and plaintiff's checks were returned as drawn on in-
sufficient funds. When plaintiffwas assessed service charges for the returned
check, he sued Crawford & Company and Carriers.2
In Count I of his petition, plaintiff alleged that Carriers issued the stop
payment order with the intent to injure him and that this act was careless,
reckless, malicious, and unjustified. In Count II, plaintiff alleged that defen-
dant Crawford & Company, also intending to cause injury, knowingly and
willfully failed to notify him that Carriers intended to stop payment. Plain-
tiff prayed for actual and punitive damages for the service charges, his em-
barassment and humiliation, and the damage to his reputation. The defen-
dants moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. They argued
that plaintiff could not recover for negligent failure to notify him of the stop
payment order because they had no duty to provide such notice. Both mo-
tions to dismiss were sustained by the trial court, and plaintiff appealed. 3
On appeal, plaintiff asserted that his petition pleaded not negligence but
an intentional tort, judicially cognizable in Missouri under the prima facie
tort doctrine. 4 This doctrine allows recovery on proof of an injurious but
otherwise lawful act done without justification and with the intent to injure
the plaintiff.5 Defendants countered that the prima facie tort is not recognized
1. 611 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
2. Id. at 267. Defendants each filed a cross-claim against plaintiffs bank.
The cross-claim asserted that if the plaintiff sustained damage as a result of defen-
dant's acts, the bank contributed to this injury and should contribute proportionally
to any judgment against the defendants. Id.
3. Id. Defendants' third party petitions were also dismissed since they were
contingent on plaintiff's claim. Id.
4. Id.
5. Recognition of a cause of action in prima facie tort can be traced to the
late 1800s when Sir Patrick Pullock stated that there is "a general proposition of
English law that it is wrong to do a willful harm to one's neighbor without justifica-
tion or excuse." F. POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 21 (Ist ed. 1887). The doctrine resur-
faced several years later in the much quoted dictum of Lord Bowen that "inten-
tionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of things to do damage
1
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in Missouri. Under Missouri law, they maintained, no amount of bad in-
tent can make a defendant liable for lawful conduct.
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District reversed the
dismissal of plaintiff's claims and became the first Missouri court to recognize
the prima facie tort. 7 The court endorsed the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and which does, in fact, damage another... is actionable if done without just cause
or excuse." Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow& Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613
(1889) (dictum), aff'd, 1892 A.C. 25 (H.L.).
Justice Holmes is credited with introducing the concept of recovery for a prima
facie tort in the United States. See Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904)
(J. Holmes); Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 504, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (1900)
(Holmes, C.J., dissenting); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077,
1081 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1894).
At an early date, both Massachusetts and New York allowed recovery in prima
facie tort for injuries caused by unjustified acts that, although otherwise lawful, were
done with the intent to injure. See Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 487, 59 N.E.
125, 126 (1901) (maliciously and without justification causing plaintiff to be
discharged from employment); Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 562 (1871) (in-
tentional and unjustified acts causing plaintiff's workmen to leave work); American
Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 231, 36 N.E.2d 123, 125 (1941)
(intentional and unjustified acts by labor unions to encourage union membership);
Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 89, 140 N.E. 203, 205 (1923) (unjustified
business competition practiced for spite); Kuyek v. Goldman, 150 N.Y. 176, 178,
44 N.E. 773, 774 (1896) (intentionally and fraudulently inducing plaintiff to marry
pregnant woman).
Although actions in prima facie tort have been most prevalent in New York,
other states have recognized the principle that unjustified, intentional acts are ac-
tionable. See, e.g., Tulle v. Pate, 372 F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (D.S.C. 1975) (applying
Georgia law); French v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 88 F. Supp. 714, 721
(D.N.J. 1950) (applying New Jersey law); Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 9 Cal. App.
3d 588, 591-92, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 445 (1970) (dictum); Connors v. Connolly, 86
Conn. 641, 647-48, 86 A. 600, 602 (1913); Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App.
188, 195-96, 89 N.E.2d 435, 438 (1949); Boggs v. Duncan-Shell Furniture Co.,
163 Iowa 106, 115-16,143 N.W. 482, 486 (1913); Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145,
150, 119 N.W. 946, 947-48 (1909); Memphis Steam Laundry-Cleaners, Inc. v.
Lindsey, 192 Miss. 224, 239, 5 So. 2d 227, 232 (1941); Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N.H.
345, 348, 74 A. 595, 598 (1909); Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582,
586-87, 175 A. 62, 66 (1934); Stollo v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 20 N.J.
Misc. 217, 222-23, 26 A.2d 559, 561-62 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
A few states have explicitly rejected the doctrine or shown disfavor towards
it. See, e.g., Krause v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 331 Mich. 19, 25, 49
N.W.2d 41, 44 (1951); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 214-15, 536 P.2d 512, 514
(1975).
6. 611 S.W.2d at 268. Defendants also argued that even if prima facie tort
is the law in Missouri, plaintiff failed to plead special damages necessary to recovery.
Id.
7. Id. The trial court's dismissal of the third party petitions was affirmed,
however, because contribution in Missouri is limited to negligent tortfeasors and
plaintiff's petition rested on intentional acts. Id. 2
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section 8708 and ruled that a party who alleges an intentional lawful act by
the defendant, an intent to cause injury to the plaintiff, an injury to the plain-
tiff, and the absence of or insufficient justification for the defendant's act
has stated a cause of action in prima facie tort.9 This decision, the court
claimed, is consistent with the guarantee contained in the Missouri Con-
stitution that every injury shall have a certain remedy", and with Missouri's
tradition of adopting new forms of action based on restatement principles.II
Missouri is not the first jurisdiction to recognize that a plaintiff should
be compensated for unjustified and malicious harm, even when traditional
tort theories do not apply. Recovery in prima facie tort has been allowed
most often in New York, but that state has shaped the doctrine into a specific
tort category with restrictive elements. 12 The Porter court, in contrast, seemed
8. Id. at 272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979) states:
One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the
other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable
under the circumstances. This liability may be imposed although the ac-
tor's conduct does not come within a traditional category of tort liability.
A detailed analysis of the restatement position on prima facie tort is contained in
Note, Prima Facie Tort, 11 CUM. L. REV. 113, 120-24 (1980).
9. Courts in prior cases have applied the theory that a plaintiff should not
suffer from unjustified and malicious acts without compensation in numerous fact
situations including: (1) labor union aggression without justification, e.g.,
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N.E.2d
308 (1939), aff'd, 312 U.S. 287 (1940); Keith Theatre, Inc. v. Vachon, 134 Me.
392, 187 A. 692 (1936); Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d
349 (1941), cert. denied, 314.U.S. 615 (1941); (2) business competition undertaken
for spite, e.g., Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909); (3) induce-
ment to breach contract without justification, e.g., Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor
Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W. 754 (1927); Reichman v. Drake, 89 Ohio App.
222, 100 N.E.2d 533 (f951); (4) countersuits for misuse oflegal process, e.g., Church
of Scientology v. Siegelman, 475 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying New
York law); Rogerv. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 111 N.E.2d 214 (1953); and (5) ut-
terance of a true statement intending to injure plaintiff, e.g., Huskie v. Griffin, 75
N.H. 345, 74 A. 595 (1909).
Missouri had adopted the theory of punishing unjustified conduct in several
specific torts including: (1) intentional interference with employment, occupation,
or business, e.g., Saloman v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Mo. 1975)
(applying Missouri law), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 536 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976); Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114
S.W. 997 (1908); and (2) intentional interference with contractual relations, e.g.,
Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Missouri law);
Union Petrochem, Inc. v. Glore, 498 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (applying
Missouri law).
10. MO. CONST. art. I, § 14.
11. 611 S.W.2d at 272.
12. Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle, 54
Nw. U.L. REV. 563, 567 (1959); Forkosch, AnAnalysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause
ofAction, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 465,475 (1957); Ward, The Tort Cause ofAction, 42 COR-
1982]
3
Braun: Braun: Prima Facie Tort Recognized in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Reposit y, 1982
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
to adopt the prima facie tort as a general theory of recovery for unjustified
conduct.' 3 Adoption of the general theory, however, raises a number of
specific questions that remain unanswered. For example, the decision leaves
unclear the meaning of "lawful" in the "intentional lawful act" that prima
facie tort plaintiffs must plead and prove. It also leaves unclear the requisite
intent for a prima facie tort, the nature of the damages a plaintiff must suf-
fer, and the amount ofjustification necessary to defeat a claim in prima facie
tort.
Although Porter clearly requires prima facie tort plaintiffs to plead an
intentional lawful act, the meaning of "lawful" is not certain. In some states,
conduct that resembles a traditional intentional tort, such as defamation,
slander, libel, or malicious prosecution, is unlawful and is not actionable
as a prima facie tort.' 4 These jurisdictions reason that the prima facie tort
doctrine should not undermine traditional tort elements designed to limit
recovery. When prima facie tort is alleged for conduct that resembles a tradi-
tional tort but lacks an essential element, the complaint is dismissed. Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 87015 advocates a less restrictive approach.
Commentj to section 870 suggests that the prima facie tort doctrine may
be used to avoid traditional tort elements that developed by historical acci-
dent or for reasons no longer significant. 16 If the traditional requirement
NELL L.Q. 28, 52-53 (1956); Note, supra note 8, at 116-17; Note, ThePrima Facie Tort
Doctrine In New York-Another Writ?, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 530, 531-33 (1968).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979) is intended as a
generalized category for tortious conduct involving harm inflicted intentionally.
It purports to provide a unifying principle whereby older established torts are refined
or new torts are established so that recovery is allowed, even if defendant's con-
duct does not fit within a traditional specific tort. Id., comment a.
14. New York has long required that the act not fit within a traditional tort
category. See Long v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 39 A.D.2d 11, 14, 330 N.Y.S.2d 664,
668 (1972) (intentional infliction of mental distress); Nationwide Carpets, Inc. v.
Lenett Publications, Inc., 31 A.D.2d 911, 911, 298.N.Y.S.2d 95, 95-96 (1969)
(libel); Metromedia, Inc. v. Mandel, 21 A.D.2d 219, 222,249 N.Y.S.2d 806,809
(abuse of process or malicious prosecution), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 615, 203 N.E.2d 914,
255 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1964); Crosby v. Reilly, 20 A.D.2d 561, 561, 246 N.Y.S.2d
59, 60-61 (1963) (defamation).
In recent years, New York seemed to have retreated from this position and al-
lowed a plaintiff to plead an alternative cause of action in prima facie tort. See Board
of Educ. v. Farmingdale Teachers Ass'n Local 1889, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d
278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975). Subsequent to Farmingdale, however, it has been
held that a plaintiff may plead prima facie tort only if the traditional tort fails because-
of a "technicality" or an "unimportant shortcoming." National Nutritional Foods
Ass'n v. Whelan, 492 F. Supp. 374, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying New York law).
15. (1979).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 commentj. In this way prima
facie tort can be used to modify the elements of traditional torts. See Note, Abstain-
ing From Willful Injury- The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 68
(1958). It has been suggested that allowing courts to ignore traditional tort elements
[Vol. 47
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supports an important policy limiting recovery, however, a plaintiff can-
not avoid it by pleading a prima facie tort. Porter's endorsement of section
870 may indicate that the court intends to apply the less restrictive defini-
tion of "lawful."
Regardless of which approach is followed, the prima facie tort may be
a vehicle for expanding recovery of punitive damages in breach of contract
cases. In Missouri, punitive damages generally are not recoverable for breach
of contract. Punitive damages may be recovered, however, when the breach
amounts to an independent willful tort and there is a proper allegation of
malice. 17 Before Porter, the plaintiff was required to prove a traditional in-
tentional tort in order to collect punitive damages.18 Now, if a breach is
malicious and unjustified and the plaintiff is injured, prima facie tort may
qualify as the independent tort, entitling a plaintiff to punitive damages. 19
It remains to be seen, however, whether policies disfavoring the award of
punitive damages for breach of contract will deter development of the prima
facie tort in this direction.
Uncertainty also surrounds the meaning of "intent to injure," an-
nounced in Porter as the second element of a prima facie tort. Three views
have been expressed on this issue. 20 Under the first and least restrictive view,
the plaintiff merely must plead and prove that the defendant intended to do
a wrongful act that caused the plaintiff injury. 21 Under the second and most
restrictive view, the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant's sole
motive for acting was to injure the plaintiff.22 Under the third and moderate
that they deem insignificant affords courts too much flexibility. See Haperns, Inter-
national Torts & the Restatement, 7 BUFFALO L. REV. 7, 12 (1957); Note, supra note
8, at 129.
17. Union Petrochem, Inc. v. Glore, 498 F. Supp. 14, 15 (W.D. Mo. 1980)
(applying Missouri law); Sands v. R.V. McKelvey-Bldg. Co., 571 S.W.2d 726,
733 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978). It is interesting to note that the malice required to
recover punitive damages is almost identical to the definition of prima facie tort
in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979).
18. For example, a plaintiff may have brought an action in defamation for
wrongfully dishonored checks, even though his claim was essentially for breach of
contract, ir order to recover punitive damages.
19. Wright v. Owen, 468 F. Supp. 1115, 1118 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (applying
Missouri law); Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM 411 (1972).
20. Note, supra note 12, at 534.
21. See, e.g., Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 24 A.D.2d 284, 286,
266 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408-09 (1965) (complaint alleged defendants intentionally
misrepresented facts concerning plaintiff, but no allegation of intent to harm); Gale
v. Ryan, 263 A.D.2d 76, 77, 31 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733-34 (1941) (complaint alleged
defendants intentionally gave false information regarding plaintiff to revenue
authorities, but no allegation of intent to harm).
22. See, e.g., Korryv. International Tel. &Tel. Corp., 444 F. Supp. 193, 195
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying New York law) (prima facie tort does not lie where defen-
dant acted with four distinct motives); Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164,
169, 124 N.E.2d 104, 106, 122 N.Y.S.2d 369, 371 (1954) (evidence was insuffi-
1982]
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view, the plaintiff must plead that the defendant's act was intentional and
that he acted with an intent to injure the plaintiff.23 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts endorses the moderate approach. Comment j to section 870
indicates that the prima facie tort plaintiff must plead that the defendant
intended the consequence of his act with certainty or substantial certainty
that injury would result.2 4 The Porter court's approval of section 870, com-
bined with its express rejection in dictum of the sole motive requirement, 25
may portend a moderate interpretation of "intent to injure."
The types of damage that must be sustained to present a submissible
prima facie tort claim is another issue raised in Porter. New York courts
distinguish general damages, which naturally and necessarily flow from the
defendant's acts, from special damages, which naturally but not necessarily
flow from defendant's acts. In New York, pleading and proof of special
damages are essential to recovery in prima facie tort.2 6 Section 870 does not
limit prima facie tort recovery to situations involving special damages. Com-
ment e of section 870 suggests that damages must amount only to the inva-
sion of a "legally protected interest." 27 Although the issue of general ver-
cient to establish defendant acted solely to injure plaintiff); Beardsley v. Kilmer,
236 N.Y. 80, 90, 140 N.E. 203, 206 (1923) (defendants acted in own self-interest
to gain profits, therefore acts were not solely motivated by malice and were not ac-
tionable). Although the Porter court suggests that New York no longer requires sole
motivation of intent to injure, the requirement has been imposed in recent cases.
See Korry v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 444 F. Supp. 193, 195 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merek & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990, 994-95 (E.D.N.Y.
1977).
23. See, e.g., Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 205-06 (1904) (defendant's
acts must be calculated to cause temporal damage); Ruza v. Ruza, 286 A.D.2d
767, 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1955) (defendant must intend to do harm rather
than merely intend to do the act).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment e (1979) also
recognizes that there may be circumstances where courts will require that the defen-
dant act with the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, as opposed to acting with cer-
tainty that injury will occur.
25. 611 S.W.2d at 270 (dictum).
26. See ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, 42 N.Y.2d 454, 458, 368 N.E.2d 1230,
1232, 398 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (1977); Cunningham v. Hagedorn, 72 A.D.2d 702,
704, 422 N.Y.S.2d 70, 73 (1979); Brandt v. Winchell, 283 A.D. 338, 342, 127
N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (1954), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E.2d 160, 170 N.Y.S.2d
828 (1958).
The Porter court indicated that the requirement of pleading special damages has
been troublesome in New York because special damages have often been confused
with pecuniary damages. The court suggested that this requirement is designed to
prevent a flood of meritless claims and has no sound analytical basis. 611 S.W.2d
at 271.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment e (1979).
[Vol. 47
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sus special damages was not dispositive in Porter,28 the court supported the
restatement position.
A final question raised but not resolved by Porter is the amount ofjustifica-
tion necessary to defeat a prima facie tort claim. In Porter, the court declared
that a prima facie tort plaintiff must plead and prove intent to injure and
that the defendant may plead and prove justification for his acts as an affir-
mative defense. 29 Once justification is properly asserted, the court must
balance social values to determine if the defendant's acts were so clearly
justified as to require a directed verdict.3 0 If the case goes to the jury, the
jury must use a similar balancing test to determine liability. 31 Although use
of a balancing test to determine justification seems straightforward, precisely
what the court and the jury are expected to balance is uncertain. Porter speaks
of social values and balancing the bad motivation of the defendant against
the claimed justification for defendant's acts.3 2 Other authorities speak of
balancing the interest of the plaintiff in being free from injury against the
interest furthered by the defendant's actions. 33 Comment e to section 870
sets forth a complicated balancing process in which the nature and seriousness
of the harm to the plaintiff, the nature and significance of interest promoted
by the defendant's conduct, the means used by the defendant to harm the
plaintiff, and the defendant's motive in harming the plaintiff are considered. 34
Each of the foregoing issues in Porter-the proper standard for assess-
ingjustification, the meaning of "lawful, " the requisite intent for a prima
facie tort, and the type of damage necessary for a submissible claim-await
judicial resolution. It remains to be seen whether Missouri, like New York, 35
will congeal prima facie tort into a narrow tort category by imposing restric-
tive requirements. By expressly endorsing the flexible restatement approach,
the court of appeals may have signaled its intention to employ the prima
facie tort doctrine in a form best calculated to achieve the goal of the Missouri
28. In Porter, the plaintiff pleaded pecuniary loss by reason of service charges.
Because such charges satisfy the narrowest view of special damages, the court did
not have to decide whether either nonpecuniary special damages or general damages
are sufficient to plead prima facie tort. 611 S.W.2d at 272.
29. Id. at 272-73.
30. Id. at 270.
31. Id.
32. Id. Although the court refers to the restatement in its use of this test, the
restatement approach is not this simplistic. See note 34 and accompanying text infra.
33. SeeMasoni v. Board of Trade, 119 Cal. App. 738, 742,260 P.2d 205, 208
(1953) (balancing objective advanced by defendant's acts and plaintiff's interest
in being free from interference); Note, supra note 12, at 538.
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment e (1979).
35. In contrast, many authorities see prima facie tort as a general aid flexi-
ble theory that, if not unduly restricted, can be used to fill in the gaps between tradi-
tional intentional torts. See Note, supra note 8, at 124; Note, The Prima Facie Tort
Doctrine, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 513 (1952); Note, supra note 12, at 543.
1982]
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Constitution provision that guarantees a certain remedy for every injury
to person, property, or character.3 6
SANDY R. BRAUN
36. See MO. CONST. art. I, § 14.
8
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